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Organized criminality 
in prisons and the 
attacks of the PCC
SÉRGIO ADORNO & FERNANDO SALLA  
Policeman watching bus that was set on fire over the Eusébio Matoso bridge on the 
Marginal Pinheiros highway, in São Paulo’s south zone, during a wave of violent attacks 
authorities attributed to the PCC.
FROM May 12- 20, 2006, 439 people were killed by gunfire in São Paulo State, according to autopsies prepared by 23 local coroners offices, which were then examined by the Regional Medical Council.1
Compared to the same period in previous years, as well as to the weeks before 
and after this period, the number of deaths was quite high, suggesting an 
exceptional situation. These deaths were accompanied by waves of violence 
including: rebellions in 73 prisons in the state, aggression and attacks against 
public agents, above all police officers and penitentiary agents, against civilians, 
against private buildings such as banks and against public buildings such as 
police stations. Fires were also set to public transport vehicles such as buses. 
The most surprising development was the temporary paralyzation of 
activities in the country’s largest city, São Paulo, quickly exacerbating the fear 
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and insecurity that have long been widespread among residents. The wave of 
violence was soon associated to Organized Crime,2 particularly the so-called 
Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) [First Command of the Capital],3 which 
irradiated from the prisons in the São Paulo penitentiary system.  Although 
there was a truce in the days after May 20, the actions continued through 
mid-August, culminating in the kidnapping of a reporter from the Rede Globo 
[Brazil’s leading television network]. The reporter was freed after one of the 
kidnappers demands was met: the transmission, by the network, of a three-
minute message from the PCC. 
  With these events as a reference, this article analyzes what made 
the attacks possible. It seeks responses in social, political and institutional 
conditions that steered  the emergence of organized criminality inside 
Brazilian prisons, with particular emphasis on São Paulo. 
The events of May 2006
The attacks of May 2006 sparked a profusion of reporting and 
editorials, pronouncements by authorities, statements by common citizens and 
analyses by specialists. The focus of the debate was the public safety crisis that 
had been dragging on in the State and certainly in Brazil, for decades.  There 
were many disagreements about the roots and nature of the problems. 
In the first place was a disagreement among authorities. On one 
hand, between federal and state authorities, and on the other among São 
Paulo state officials themselves. It is important to remember that the country 
was just a few months from presidential and gubernatorial elections, and 
the issue of public safety clearly was in the forefront in political and public 
debates. There were also disagreements among state executive authorities and 
among the three branches of state government. Disagreements between the 
Secretary of Public Safety and the Secretary of Penitentiary Administration 
about the handling of the crisis and its immediate resolution were more 
than evident. In addition, the waves of violence revived traditional disputes 
between the public safety areas of state government and representatives of 
the Public Ministry [the State Attorney’s office]and the Judicial Branch. The 
traditional disagreements between the civil and military police forces were 
less evident.
Differences among the citizenry appeared in numerous print and television 
interviews, as well as in “letters to the editor” of the major newspapers. These 
sources compose a repertoire of heterogeneous reviews of the events, expressions of 
fear and insecurity, reports of living conditions in the city and criticisms of public 
safety policies. Meanwhile, specialists spoke from an accumulation of knowledge 
gained in their professional experience or from research, such as lawyers, 
professionals in the health field, journalists, and academic researchers. They are 
different from the others, because they explore in greater depth the social reasons 
for the violence and its impact on the justice system.                          
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While all of these actors had a contribution to make toward an 
understanding of the facts, the distinct voices reveal that not enough is known 
about the man known as Marcola [considered to be the top leader] and his 
companions. Information about the PCC is also limited. PCC and its leaders 
have proven to be more than mere agents of organized criminality. The images 
that were fed by police and disseminated by the print and electronic media 
appear to correspond to only part of reality. The attacks and rebellions were 
orchestrated by daring and violent delinquents, who were able to impose a 
curfew on the city and flood São Paulo State with spectacular and astounding 
blood baths reminiscent of the gangland style found in Chicago and New York 
in the early 20th century. 
There was, however, another side: the leaders were sustained by an 
organization maintained by an hierarchical structure of disciplined and 
obedient “employees” capable of executing orders without questioning them. 
Possibly operating from a base of support networks disseminated in distinct 
mobile points throughout the state, they revealed that they had an able and 
agile communication system among leaders, followers and those who took 
orders, through protected channels barely permeated by external interference 
by means of cell phones, telephone exchanges and  “carrier pigeons”. This 
system was tested during the waves of attacks, proving that the organization 
was prepared to control the simultaneous execution of countless rebellions; to 
attack distinct targets without a predetermined logic and with a high level of 
surprise; to appear at any location and disappear immediately; to issue orders 
and soon after, suspend actions and negotiate with high state authorities. 
What was most surprising is that the base territory of the entire 
organization is within the prisons of São Paulo State, in particular maximum 
security facilities where the main leaders of PCC are found. For the past few 
years, organized criminality has been well situated within the prisons, an 
expense of the massive incarceration policy executed by the state governments 
of Governors Mario Covas (1995-2001) and Gerald Alckmin (2001-2006). If 
the issue was limited to domination of the prisons, it is more probable that the 
waves of violence would have gravitated around simultaneous rebellions, as 
took place in February 2001. But something new appeared: the functionality 
of the relations behind and over the prison walls. Organized criminality, more 
specifically the PCC, had mounted a very solid  external support network. 
What made these waves of violence possible?
Changes in the profile of criminality and violence in Brazil
It is still premature to conduct an exhaustive analysis of the social and 
political reasons for these events. Certainly, they have more complex roots than 
it is possible to analyze within the scope of this article. Whatever the reasons, 
the emergence of organized criminality in Brazil cannot be separated from the 
conditions and trends found in contemporary society, in particular since the 
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1970’s, in the wake of the neoliberal changes that inaugurated the so-called 
era of economic globalization and the weakening of the nation-states. In a 
short space of time these changes promoted deep deregulation of markets, 
above all financial markets. This triggered an ordered sequence of processes: 
alteration of traditional national borders, incentives to an increasingly 
malleable flow of capital, the creation of space for illegal activities that made 
the ownership of capital autonomous, monetary circulation to physical 
paradises free from institutional constraints, apt for the financing of operations 
such as trafficking in drugs, people and human organs, weapons smuggling, 
fiscal and financial fraud, pirating of merchandise and services, falsification of 
pharmaceuticals, the spread of gambling and other modalities (Ram, 2001;
Naim, 2006).   
It is equally certain that none of this would have been successful if not for 
the spectacular technological developments, above all in the field of computing 
and telecommunications,  which stimulated, above all, the mobility of people, 
goods and services, making many activities hidden, poorly accessible and 
invisible to the institutional controls of nation states, with increasingly outdated 
modus operandi and inefficient results (Bauman, 1998; Ziegler, 2003). In the 
same manner, the rapid emergence and dissemination of organized criminality 
found favorable conditions in the also global standards of urban development.  
The accelerated rise of megacities, with more than eight million inhabitants and 
with their polycentric systems, instituting zones of social and spatial segregation, 
set the stage for the rise of new standards of poverty and new forms of social 
inequalities (Davis, 2006), in particular inequalities of rights, which condemn 
expressive portions of the low income urban population to social life immersed 
in the world of illegalities  (Telles & Cabanes, 2006).  
In Brazil, this scenery is aggravated by the crisis in public safety, 
which has been dragging on for at least three decades. Crime has increased 
and become more violent; organized criminality has spread through society 
reaching economic activities far beyond traditional crimes against property, 
increasing the homicide rates, above all among adolescents and young adults, 
and disorganizing forms of social life and standards of inter- and intra-class 
sociability. Nevertheless, public safety policies continue to be formulated and 
implanted according to conventional, aged models, which are incapable of 
accompanying the quality of the social and institutional changes underway 
within society. Crime became modernized; although the application of law 
and order remains enclosed in the old police model of running after known 
bandits or supported in networks of informants – in spite of enormous 
investments in  public safety, promoted either by the federal government, or by 
state governments in the expansion  and training of human resources, as well 
as in the re-equipping of police forces. 
For this reason, it is not surprising that organized crime has emerged at 
the surface of daily life and the waves of violence of May 2006 were possible.  
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Nevertheless, contrary to what may have appeared at first sight, the waves 
of May 2006, in São Paulo, despite their exceptionality, did not constitute a 
unique and isolated phenomenon. There were precedents. The examples are 
countless and can be seen in the various rebellions that shook the penitentiary 
systems of  São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro States since the  early 1990’s. For 
nearly 20 years now  they have displayed a high level of organizational ability, 
as demonstrated in São Paulo State by the rebellions in the Hortolândia 
House of Detention and in Penitentiary I at Ttremembé in 1995 and above 
all by the mega-rebellion of 2001 that simultaneously shook 29 penitentiary 
establishments, supported by cell phones and clandestine telephone exchanges, in 
a synchronized organization never seen before. 
Equipment from a clandestine telephone exchange used by alleged criminals linked to the 
PCC, seized in an operation organized by the civil police of São Bernardo do Campo (SP).
The situation was not very different in Rio de Janeiro, with the eclosion 
of two rebellions in a short period of time: that at the Bangu 3 prison in 
November 2001, and in penitentiary establishments in September 2002. In 
the latter, part of the city was paralyzed by the intimidation of the Comando 
Vermelho,   probably the most important association of organized criminals 
in that state, which was able to interrupt commerce by closing stores and even 
shopping centers. It also interrupted school activities and public transport, 
leaving thousands of passengers unable to move through the city (Caldeira, 
2004, p.45). In the same context, there were assaults on public buildings in 
February 2003. 
Although these organizations have spread their activities and field of 
influence beyond their states of origin, there is no clear evidence that a type of 
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congress has been established between them, as to a certain degree took place 
in U.S. cities in the past century (Enzensberger, 1967; Gurr, 1989), in the 
sense that they adopted common and connected actions. It is more probable 
that the circulation of information within the criminal environment, facilitated 
by intermediaries of all types, and the broadcast of information by means of 
electronic media, also has contributed to disseminated modalities of actions 
judged by the principal leaders as successful because they were capable of 
surprising the authorities responsible for repressing crimes. 
This is where the political scope of these rebellions and attacks are 
found. They do not involve organized popular collectives that struggle 
against social injustices and inequalities and affirm the conquest of rights. 
Appealing to unchecked violence, without sparing deaths, and capable of 
terrorizing society, their actions place them in direct conflict with police and 
judicial authorities, with professional politicians, the media and  informed 
public opinion and stimulate growing reactions that also appeal for violence 
in an interminable cycle of revenge. It is not without reason that the waves of 
attacks by organized crime are followed by reactions from civil and military 
police that also result in deaths, whose circumstances lack, as a rule, rigorous 
investigation. 
To understand how organized crime emerged on the daily public 
scene, it is necessary to go back to the 1960’s and 1970’s. Since this time, 
Brazilian society has experienced progressive growth in violent urban crime, 
in addition to other manifestations of violence in social and interpersonal 
relations. Recognizing regional differences and social, political and institutional 
singularities of each Brazilian state, some trends have been established since 
1988. The crimes of theft, drug dealing, and extortion by means of kidnapping, 
along with homicides were those that had the highest growth rates. 
The rise in crime is a phenomenon found on all continents, in particular 
North and South America, and more recently in southwest Asia and in African 
countries. For this reason, it is not expected that Brazilian society was immune 
to this movement of growing trends, above all because these countries are 
found on the international routes for drugs and other transnational modes 
of organized crime such as weapons smuggling, activities that appear to fuel 
violent crime. But it is surprising to find that rates of violent criminality in 
Brazil, in cities such as Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, are higher than those in  
some U.S. cities. 
Until the late 1990’s, there were no official statistics on criminality 
for the country as a whole,4 a need that is just beginning to be filled. The 
data available, for the years 1999 - 2001, presented by the National Secretary 
of Public Safety (Senasp), an organ of the Ministry of Justice, indicate that, 
relative to the country as a whole, the rates of violent crime for 100,000 
residents – homicide, theft, theft followed by death, extortion by kidnapping, 
drug dealing, rape – are, roughly, higher than in other countries with 
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characteristics of social organization similar to those of Brazil. The homicide 
rate for Brazil (28.46 homicides per 100,000 residents, in 2002) was a bit lower 
than the average expected for countries of low and medium income  (=32.1 
homicides per 100,000 residents) (cf. OPAS, 2005). Considering the period 
1991 - 2000, this rate grew, for the country as a whole, by 72.58%.
It is important to note that Brazil was in first place in 1999, in the 
ranking of deaths by homicides of youth from 15 - 24, with rates of 86.7 and 
6.5 per 100,000 respectively for 
males and females. These rates are more than double those for 
countries such as Mexico and Russia (www.paho.org.). These trends grew 
over the decade, not leveling off until 2002 (Cardia et al., 2006), a period that 
coincided with the second administration of President Fernando Henrique 
Cardoso (1998-2002). Since then, homicide rates have been declining in the 
metropolitan regions of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, for reasons that are still 
not well known (Adorno, 2005).
The growth of crime and violence in Brazil, is to a large degree, a 
consequence of the emergence and dissemination of organized criminality, in 
particular that related to drug dealing, a phenomenon that has intensified since 
the 1980’s (Zaluar, 2004). As is known, drug trafficking requires an emerging 
market of consumers searching for new social experiences and with means to 
regularly acquire drugs. To function, this market requires the  cooperation of 
poor citizens, without work or without hope for a defined future, to serve as 
salaried workers to control: drug distribution, points of sale, the circulation of 
money and debts contracted by consumers and small dealers. In contrast, they 
must obey commands, including killing rivals and promoting urban disorder. 
Little by little, a type of urban slavery is established, similar to that found in 
rural areas. 
The increase in the numbers of urban criminality indicate substantive 
changes in the standards of urban delinquency and criminality. Until the 
mid 1960’s, individualized actions prevailed, mostly related to crimes against 
property. The distribution and accessibility to firearms was much lower, 
above all those that are highly lethal. Although there were  recriminations 
among members of syndicates and gangs, most homicides were motivated 
by disagreements in interpersonal and intersubjective relations, particularly 
involving romantic disputes and personal revenge. Crimes related to drug 
consumption were still limited and did not appear as the object of collective 
disturbances or as an issue emphasized in public policies adopted by agencies 
responsible for repression of common crime. In the late 1960’s, this situation 
began to change with the fast spread in consumption and the entrance into 
the illegal drug trade of citizens from low-income socioeconomic stratum, 
inhabitants of popular neighborhoods of large urban centers. 
The peculiarity of organized crime in Brazil – and - in general, its 
prevalence in prisons – reveals aspects that distinguish it from other modalities 
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found in the world. In various countries, the ethnic, racial or national 
components (for example Italian and Irish in the United States in the past 
century) are often decisive in establishing identity ties among members of a 
criminal association. Meanwhile in Brazil, the construction of identity relations 
among criminal groups is found first in the criminal act itself, in the condition 
of the incarcerated criminal. They are also very probably based on the social 
filiation to which the overwhelming majority of its participants belong, that is, to 
the social economic strata from where they are preferentially recruited, residents 
of the metropolitan territories on the frontier between legality and illegality.
To understand the singularities of organized criminality in Brazil, it is 
necessary to look critically at the models of analysis that prevail, until recently, 
in the specialized international literature. Thus, the model of the Mafias and 
its form of development in Italian society  (Lupo, 2002) since the 19th century, 
and its later dissemination in the United States in the early decades of the 20th
century, does not appear suitable for explaining the forms that collective crime 
organization has assumed in contemporary Brazilian society. 
National and regional ties had some presence in the history of crime 
in Brazil in the end of the 19th and early 20th centuries, due to intense waves 
of immigration (Monsma et al., 2003). Nevertheless, this does not explain 
the organizational characteristics indicated in the specialized studies. While 
this process certainly has its singularities in each of Brazil’s large metropolitan 
regions (singularities due not only to social and institutional relations, but 
also to timing and rhythm), some of their characteristics appear more or less 
identical, as indicated by the specialized literature (Zaluar, 2004; Misse, 2006;
Mingardi, 1998). The contemporary history of the emergence of organized 
criminality, above all related to drug dealing, for the city and state of São 
Paulo, is still to be reconstructed, while valuable clues can be found in the few 
existing studies, reports and memoirs (Bicudo, 2002; Carlini et al., 1996;and 
more recently, 2003; Christino, 2001).
If despite the advances represented by the studies of Zaluar (2004),
Misse (2006) and Minguardi (1998) mentioned above, little is known about 
organized criminality in Brazil  (Schilling, 2001), knowledge about criminal 
organization within the prisons is even less developed (Caldeira, 2003; Salla, 
2006; Lima, 2003, Barbato Junior, 2007; Azevedo, 2004) and more specifically 
about the control and subjection of broad masses of inmates by associations 
such as the Comando Vermelho and PCC. Two pioneer studies (Paixão, 
1987; Campos Coelho, 2005) – of which the later studies of penitentiary 
organizations are, to a large degree, tributaries – had the merit of raising 
hypotheses to explain the emergence of organized criminality in this society. 
The modality of organized criminality with its origin in the prisons was 
established in the 1970’s in Rio de Janeiro, and grew rapidly in the following 
decade. In São Paulo, however, this process expanded later, in the 1990’s, 
although there were signs of its existence in the previous decade. Until then, 
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the prisons were populated by criminals who mostly  acted individually, in 
small groups or gangs lacking identity ties that sustained them over time. 
Paixão (1987) indicated that the first known groups of organized 
criminals in the 1980’s  (the Falange Vermelha, Serpentes Negras),  in both 
Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, were more than a sub-product of a conviviality 
among common prisoners – as often suggested by scholars. Paixão maintained 
they were a consequence of what he identified as the “modernization of 
metropolitan criminality”. Bank robberies and drug trafficking were criminal 
activities that required increasing “organized action as a requirement of 
efficiency”, according to Paixão (1987,p.77). This organizational capacity 
resulted not only in economic gains but also in prestige for some in the world 
of crime, those who rose among the mass of prisoners. This was one of the 
bases for the constitution of leaders in the prison environment and even for the 
constitution of groups that began to demand their own identity in the world 
of urban criminality. 
These leaders, to a 
large degree, became 
stronger because 
they understood 
how to manipulate 
and  monopolize the 
resources available in 
prison to accumulate 
wealth, exploiting 
from within illegal 
activities such as drug 
dealing, extortion of 
other inmates and 
their families and the 
control of locations 
and activities. 
It is important 
to remember, as the 
few available studies 
indicate, that in Brazil, 
the prison population 
is largely composed 
of poor inmates 
with few personal 
resources, people 
who are susceptible 
to immediate influences 
and vulnerable to 
arbitrary and violent 
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Banners with the initials PCC (Primeiro Comando da 
Capital) and the criminal organization’s motto [peace, 
justice] was displayed by the rebel prisoners in the Carandiru 
Penetenciary Complex.
ESTUDOS AVANÇADOS 21 (61), 200716
actions of from a variety of sources. Although not very aggressive, they wind 
up being co-opted by the organized crime leaders. Three elements appear 
to explain the subjection of the inmates to these emerging leaders: fear, 
calculation and resignation  (Paixão, 1987).
The fear is associated with the permanent threat of physical violence. 
From whatever source, violence constitutes a normative code of behavior. 
Everything is subject to dispute: conflicts between gangs; suspected 
informants; involvement in drug trafficking, the exploitation of internal 
activities, the trafficking of influence over the “powerful”, whether those in 
the inmate population or the administration; possession of personal objects; 
obtention of sexual favors, which involve not only inmates, particularly the 
younger ones and first timers, who are often sold within the population, but 
also their wives, girlfriends and daughters; maintenance of privileges won 
or granted and disputes over work posts. It is common to find homicides 
practiced in a barbarous manner, publicized mouth to mouth as a sign of 
virility and courage. Beyond this spectrum of violence there are also rapes, 
aggressions of one inmate against another, the settling of scores notably found 
during the rebellions and riots, the “death pacts” and the confrontation, at 
times dramatic, between organized  inmates within the prisons and established 
authorities  (Adorno, 1991).
The calculation of advantages and disadvantages also does not appear 
to be absent in this social territory. Not rarely, for many inmates, the criminal 
organizations, inside and outside the prisons, are considered and experienced 
as a source of material assistance and self-protection against the arbitrary 
actions of the police and even against the attacks of rival gangs. The by-laws 
of the PCC, which were presented in the media, are quite illustrative of this 
model of self-protection. The by-laws speak of loyalty, solidarity and union in 
the struggle against injustices and oppression within the prisons. Item 4 calls 
for the contribution of those who are free to the brothers who are in prison, 
by intermediary of lawyers, money, help to families, and prison breaks. At
the same time, it threatens with penalty by death without forgiveness, those 
found in liberty who are “well established” and who forget to contribute 
to their imprisoned brothers.5 It is an organization impregnated with rigid 
values. At the same time that it preaches solidarity and calls for struggle 
against injustice, it also calls for the application of the death penalty without 
appeal or judgement.  As if translating traces of the Brazilian political cultural, 
it establishes a sort of moral syncretism between tradition (personal self-
protection) and modernity (an appeal to justice and to law). 
   It is certain that physical violence and self-protection constitute 
important dimensions as resources of oppression of the leaders over the mass 
of inmates who lack the power or capacity to counter the organization on their 
own. Nevertheless, these elements do not work on their own. They combine 
with a third element, the strong resignation of the inmates in accepting this 
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rough and primitive form of personal domination.  Campos Coelho (2005)
suggested that the power of a group of inmates who were actually known as the 
Security Laws (and later became known as the Falange Vermelha) came from a 
number of sources including: the prestige that the leaders had in the world of 
crime because of the nature of the criminal activity that they practiced (bank 
robbery); by not constituting a closed group and for being permeable to new 
adhesions; for the respect for the rules created by the prisoners themselves; 
and finally, for the fidelity “of each and all in relation to the ‘society of the 
captives’” (ibid, p.344-5).
Considering all of these factors, history came to repeat itself in the 
case of the formation of the PCC and in its later ascent on the inmate 
population of São Paulo. This contributed to solidifying the web of solidarity 
among the inmates, by the imposition of violence and fear, but also through 
the construction of a perception of belonging, revealed in the fact that the 
members of the group called each other “brothers”. 
None of this would have prospered if, on the part of the government, 
the prison authorities had not frequently hesitated to rigorously prohibit the 
illegalities practiced by the leaders and the growing prestige of the power 
acquired among the prisoners and among criminals out of prison. Fearful 
that actions demanding correctional discipline would compromise the fragile 
balance of internal prison order, they wound up favoring the constitution 
of these organized leaderships. Finally, the strengthening of organized 
criminality was even benefited by the policy of massive imprisonment executed 
by the administrations of São Paulo Governors Covas and Alkmin.  
Penitentiary policies and organized criminality
Everything indicates that it would be possible to relate the formation 
and consolidation of the PCC to the isolation measures imposed through the 
creation of special prison units, such as the annex to the Casa de Custódia 
[Custody House] of Taubaté, or even to the creation of the differentiated 
disciplinary regime.6 Therefore, it is necessary to review recent developments in 
penitentiary policy in Brazil and in particular in São Paulo State.
Prisons in Brazil, except for some brief moments in its history, have 
always had decrepit conditions of habitability caused by overcrowding, material 
privations, violence and arbitrary treatment. The innovations introduced in 
the penal codes (for example in 1890 and in 1940) in terms of execution 
of sentences, which could reverse this situation, were implemented on a 
very limited scale. Since the middle of the last century, prison policies have 
followed the same guidelines, and were rarely reformed: they were conceived 
as responses to the emergencies provoked by the rise in crime, by rebellions 
and escapes, by difficult conditions of incarceration, by the instability of prison 
institutions always towing behind the unexpected changes in their direction. 
This situation generates unease in the prison population, which is a frequent 
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source of rebellion and riots. It is not unusual that, in this scenery of poor 
innovation, government interventions have been insufficient to confront the 
problems that had accumulated over time, which were limited to expanding 
capacity (Fischer & Adorno, 1987).
During the military dictatorship (1964-1985), the prison system was 
completely subordinated to the national security policy. Its guidelines were 
the contention of political opposition and of criminality at any cost and the 
arbitrary imprisonment of suspects and the persecuted, this policy contributed 
to the overcrowding of public prisons and jails. In this context, arbitrary 
action, torture, ill treatment of common criminals, which were common for 
decades in Brazilian prisons (Salla & Alvarez, 2006), appear to have expanded. 
The return to the democratic state of law in the second half of the 
1980’s did not substantially alter this situation, in spite of the institutional 
changes that were being introduced. For a long time persisted:  imprisonment 
for investigation without judicial order; frightful clandestine activities 
of paramilitary organizations, even of those under direct government 
responsibility, such as torture as a common method of investigation in police 
stations and precincts; arbitrary application of regulations, including the use of 
maximum security cells as an instrument of contention and repression of the 
prison population and ill treatment issued daily to inmates. In addition, the 
absence of protection of the rights consecrated in international conventions 
(the right to work, professionalization, schooling, decent humane treatment, 
legal and social assistance) made evident the failure of the prison system in the 
ten years following the country’s return to the state of law (1985-1995).
Since the democratization of the country, the penitentiary policies have 
been immersed in a contradictory dynamic: on one hand are the inheritances 
of arbitrariness and violence, of authoritarian management, of invisibility of 
the territories of incarceration, and little control over administration. On the 
other, the establishment of the state of law imposed the need for agencies and 
agents to adjust to democratic guidelines, of which the policies for the so-
called humanization of the prisons in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, in the 
1980’s, during the administrations of Governors Leonel Brizola and Franco 
Montoro, respectively, constituted inaugural marks. Little by little, timid but 
significant advances were noted in inmates’ rights. This includes demands for 
greater transparency in the administration of prisons and control of corruption 
and the arbitrary application of regulations by public agents. This trend 
continued in the next decade with the creation of secretariats of Penitentiary 
Administration with no ties to the state secretariats of Public Safety or even 
of Justice, as well as the creation of special auditors and complaint centers, 
in conjunction with expanded cell capacity, to mitigate the effects of prison 
overcrowding. 
These advances were accompanied by resistance to the changes from 
conservative political forces and agencies responsible for applying law and 
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order, in particular the military police. Encouraged by the reigning impunity,7
cases of torture and ill-treatment continued, as well as corruption and other 
illegalities practiced by government agents. In the dominion of the prisons, 
penitentiary agents found more than a few opportunities to confront higher 
authorities publicly committed to introducing institutional changes and 
implanting guidelines recognized to protect inmates rights. They provoked 
instability within the prisons by not providing services and by collusion with 
the movements that resulted in escapes and rebellions, and with the level of 
inmate deaths. The massacre of Carandiru, in 1992, with the death of 111 
inmates, and the case of the 42nd Police district of São Paulo were, exemplar in 
this sense.8
The administrations of Presidents Fernando Henrique Cardoso and 
Luiz Inacio “Lula” da Silva’s  first mandate  (2003-2006), inherited this 
institutional situation. Public safety and prison policies were administrated 
within a tense and delicate situation: that of having to rigorously apply law 
and order, not rarely responding to the appeal of public pressure, while 
simultaneously respecting the human rights of the inmates under tutelage 
and custody of the prisons and complying with international norms to 
which the country is signatory. On one hand, these governments  acted in 
keeping with the trends of Brazilian prison law. While at the beginning of 
the democratic reconstruction process some changes were voted in prison and 
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Rebellion in the Provisional Detention Center of Guarulhos (SP) which resulted in the 
deaths of seven inmates. Alongside the bodies are written the words The seven worm  (sic) 
CdL, code for the Democratic Command for Liberty faction, a group rival to the CrBC 
(Revolutionary Brazilian Command of Criminality), accused of having committed 
brutal assassinations.
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penitentiary legislation in an attempt to remove the “authoritarian remains”, 
the “humanist” trend of penitentiary legislative reform was interrupted at the 
dawn of the 1990’s, under pressure from public opinion left insecure by the 
wave of violent crime, above all kidnappings followed by the killing of those 
kidnapped, which occurred throughout the country. The situation led to 
Law no. 8.072, known as the Heinous Crime Law, of July 25, 1990, which 
although it had a poor legal foundation, led to a growth in  the number of 
inmates, by calling for longer sentences and limited parole.9 Later laws, such as 
No.8.930/94, 9.677/98 and 9.695/98, expanded those crimes considered to be 
heinous (Teixeira, 2006).10
The events of May and August 2006 once again stimulated various 
proposed laws that would impose more rigorous penalties and reduce the age 
of criminal responsibility. Two of these initiatives were instituted:  on March 
29, 2007, the President sanctioned two public safety laws, which had been 
quickly approved by Congress.  The first determined that the possession and 
use of cellular telephones and radio communicators in prisons was a grave lack 
of discipline by an inmate and a crime if committed by a guard. 11 The second 
restricted the rights of the authors of “heinous crimes” by establishing that 
inmates condemned for this type of crime could only obtain a parole for their 
sentence and provisional liberty after completing at least 40% (two-fifths) of 
their sentence for first time offenders and 60% (three fifths) for recidivists.12 
Voted in the context of the national commotion in a hurried initiative by a 
federal government and Parliament eager for firm and immediate responses to 
the popular outcry, these initiatives did not necessarily produce the expected 
results, and won discredit and criticism from legal scholars and technical 
operators of penal law. 
On the other hand, the government interventions sought to modernize 
prison administration, respecting international conventions that regulated the 
basic rules for treating inmates. In 1996, the Fernando Henrique Cardoso 
government launched the National Human Rights Program (PndH) that included 
a set of proposals for government actions for the prison system, placing on the 
federal government’s  political agenda explicit commitments to the promotion and 
protection of these rights for the incarcerated population (Adorno, 2000). These 
trends were reaffirmed with the edition of the National Public Safety Plan, in 
2002. The Lula government gave continuity to these initiatives. Although each 
government had its own style, in general the actions sought: a) increased capacity 
in the penitentiary system and drastic reduction of overcrowding;  b) to create 
penitentiaries subordinated to the federal government for crimes established by 
the federal justice system; c) to promote and finance the construction in the states 
of maximum security penitentiaries to contain the leaders of drug trafficking and 
other activities of organized criminality. 
A result of these opposing trends is the expressive growth in the rates 
of imprisonment, over nearly three decades. From 2000 – 2006 alone, the 
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prison population nearly doubled. Nevertheless, the National Penitentiary 
Department  (Depen), of the Ministry of Justice, calculated that the deficit in 
the penitentiary system was only 103,433 vacancies. 
Table 1 – Incarcerated Population and imprisonment rate for 100,000 residents – Brazil, 
1969-2006
Year Inmates Rate (per 100 thousand)
1969 28,538 30
1988 88,041 65.2
1993 126,152 83.2
1995 148,760 95.4
1997 170,207 108.6
2000 211,953 134.9
2002 248,685 146.5
2003 308,304 181.5
2004 336,358 185.2
2005 361,402 196.2
2006 401,236 214.8
Source: Ministério da Justiça and IBGE, for 1969.
In São Paulo State, the stage of the events of May 2006, this scenary 
was even more accentuated. In 1989, there were 28 prison establishments under 
the responsibility of the Coordination of the Penitentiary Establishments of 
São Paulo (Coespe). In 2006, the equivalent state agency, the Secretariat of 
Penitentiary Administration (SAP), was responsible for 144 prison institutions
(Salla, 2007). It is also noted that in 2006, 90.57% of those incarcerated were 
in the penitentiary system, which indicates the state government’s success  in 
transferring from public jails and detention cells at police stations, inmates sentenced 
by the Justice system. Graph 1 indicates this movement, showing the accentuated 
growth in the rate of occupation in the Sâo Paulo penitentiary system, compared 
with the public jails and detention cells at police stations, in the capital and interior 
of the state, in the period from 1990- 2003:
This frenetic rhythm of growth of the incarcerated population 
deepened the deficiencies of the prison system throughout the country. The 
already deteriorated conditions of habitability, the deficits in services and 
assistance (legal, healthcare and from social workers) to inmates only grew. In 
1994 the São Paulo penitentiary system had one employee for 2.17 inmates 
(14,702 employees for 31,842 inmates). In 2006, the proportion dropped 
to one employee for 4.99 inmates (25,172 employees for 125,523 inmates). 
That is  the inmate population nearly quadrupled, while that of the employees 
(nearly 80% of whom are security guards) did not even double. For Brazil as 
a whole, the situation is no different and even more grave in some states.13 It 
is understood that the maintenance of internal order in the prisons became 
weaker. It is also understood the reasons for which conflicts among inmates 
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and between inmates and prison guards actually grew sharply in response to 
the tougher application of internal sanctions, such as isolation of leaders in 
maximum security cells and in quite rigorous regimes of compliance.  
The consequences of this process of massive incarceration also include 
changes in the form of administrating the prisons. The maintenance of internal 
order has been assured at the cost of severe control and discipline, which is 
also not lacking in paradoxes. On one hand, prison wings are created or special 
disciplinary units to contain leaders and organized groups. In December 
2003, Law no.10.792 regulated the so-called Differentiated Disciplinary Regime.
Under this law, inmates who provoke rebellions and acts of indiscipline can 
be held for up to 360 days in special prisons or special wings, while confined 
22 hours per day in individual cells, without realization of activities and with 
rigorous visiting restrictions. Thus, in some units there is a prevalence, at 
least apparently, of control over the inmates, discipline, immobilization and a 
blocking of communications with the outside world. 
On the other, however, in most prisons in the country, even those 
considered to be maximum security, controls over the inmate population are 
weak and incapable of containing the organization of inmates, illegal activities, 
revolts and escapes. The insufficiency of dynamic security – that is, activities 
Source: Secretaria da Administração Penitenciária (SAP), Coordenadoria dos estabelecimentos 
Penitenciários (Coespe), Secretaria de Segurança Pública (SSP), Departamento de Polícia 
Judiciária da Macro São Paulo (Demacro), Departamento de Polícia Judiciária da Capital (Decap) 
and Fundação Seade.
Graph 1
Justice and security: prison movement and the incarcerated population. Rate of prison 
occupation, according to types of establishment. São Paulo State – 1990-2003.
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that help maintain internal order, such as work, education, sport, leisure and 
cultural activities 14 – wind up countering and annulling the expectations placed 
on the toughening of discipline and control of inmate behavior. One of the 
consequences of this situation is the accentuated militarization of the state 
prison systems, a trend that reaffirms the inheritances of the authoritarian 
regime. In 2003, according to Lemgruber (2004), 45.8% of Brazilian states had 
military police working in internal security in prisons. It is not rare to find prison 
units in Brazil where prison security was nearly completely substituted by armed 
civil or military police who control the daily activities of the prison. 
*   *   *
Penitentiary policies that have been implanted by state government have 
not been able to interrupt the cycle of expansion and deepening of organized 
criminality in civil society. To the contrary, there is strong evidence that the 
mass incarceration associated with the rigorous contention of the leaders of 
organized criminal groups has produced adverse effects. First, it has stimulated 
sharp perceptions of injustice among the inmates, favoring and legitimating 
violent reactions orchestrated by the leaders. It is not without reason, that 
in the PCC By-Laws, item 14 affirms that the priority of the command is to 
“pressure the state governor to deactivate that concentration camp ‘annex  to 
the Casa de Custódia e Tratamento de Taubaté, from where rose the seed and 
the roots of the command, amid many inglorious struggles and considerable 
atrocious suffering”. In the communiqué attributed to the PCC, exhibited on 
the Rede Globo television network in August 2006, as part of the demand to 
release the kidnapped journalist, they admonished: “We want the law to be 
complied with in its totality. We do not want any favors”. 
These are moments of social effervescence  (Durkheim, 2000) that 
are perfect for breeding a preparation of attacks, the most striking example 
of which were the waves of violence of May 2006. They are also moments of 
“war” (Foucault, 1997), in which the distinctions and opposition between 
“us” and “them” becomes polarized, among those assumed to be denied 
justice and the others, considered their oppressors and enemies. The same 
communiqué read: “we made very clear that our struggle is against the 
governments and the police forces”. In these times, the solidarity among 
“brothers” is reinforced, as well as the ties among those who are incarcerated 
and those “on the outside”.
In the case of May 2006, the war was waged between criminals and the 
police. It was a war long in the making, as has been shown. The confrontations 
were being fed by daily disputes, which were often banal, due, for example, 
to the breaking of agreements involving interests concerning a wide variety of 
objects. The spark was the threat or the transfer of inmates. The environment 
within prisons had been tense for a long time, due to the changes in 
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penitentiary management. It is known that expectations of changes in prison 
administration are regularly received with disturbances. In an environment 
in which social relations are precarious arrangements, lacking in reciprocity, 
marked by unequal and hierarchical relations, subject to unexpected rupture, 
changes in administration accentuate these sentiments. The reactions are 
always ready. The preparation for war is permanent. It is not unusual that the 
order to unleash the attacks came from within the prisons.  
It is not to be expected, however, that the PCC and its demands for 
justice could constitute the embryo of a social revolution and the construction 
of a new society based on justice, equality and democracy. What is at play are 
business interests, as the studies of  Zaluar and Misse show well. The leaders 
are not afraid to take punitive measures; they do not hesitate to kill and issue 
justice with no right to defense. They expect to defeat their enemies; although 
they do not expect to win sympathy, solidarity or support from those who 
live tormented by their criminal actions. They do not have a political plan for 
the construction of a democratic society; their conception of society is crude, 
based on loyalty between “brothers” and on the social conception of the 
extensive family, a constellation of material and moral interests. 
On the other hand, there is no more space for innocence and for the 
innocent. Public policies result in often unexpected effects. Security, law and 
order and justice cannot be isolated from pressure from common sense or 
from the political interests of the day, nor from the interests of the agencies 
responsible for containing crime and violence. In democracy, authorities are 
elected precisely, to in the name of the citizens, make good decisions. In an 
era of profound changes in the widest spheres of social existence, including the 
domain of respect for or transgression of laws, making good decisions requires 
technical wisdom, a sense of proportion and justice in decision making, and 
an ethical sense of responsibility. Only in this way will it be possible to have 
success in the “strong and slow boring of hard boards” which is politics 
(Weber, 1970, p.123).
Notes
1  Conselho Regional de Medicina do estado de são Paulo, relatório final da análise de 
493 laudos necroscópicos referentes ao período de 12 a 20 de maio, coletados nos 23 iMls 
do estado, cujas necropsias associaram a causa mortis como decorrente de ferimentos por 
armas de fogo, Sept. 1, 2006. Quoted by Mesquita Neto (2007, p.27-9).
2  The concept of organized crime and its application to Brazilian society has stimulated 
intense debate among scholars. In this article, the concept of organized criminality 
will be used, however, the recognition  that this concept is susceptible to a series of 
contradictions and the source of disagreements  (Fontanaud, 2002). see in this regard: 
Zaluar (2004), Misse (2006), Mingardi (1998), Oliveira & Zaverucha (2006), about 
the extensive foreign bibliography, referred to in Rayan & Rush (1997) and Leclerc 
(1996).
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3  Little is effectively known about the origins and the history of organized criminality in 
the state of São Paulo, in addition to Mingardi (1998), Christino (2001) and Amorim
(1993). There is accumulated  knowledge comparable to the studies about Rio de 
Janeiro, in particular the long studies of Zaluar (2004) and of Misse (2006), already 
mentioned. Nevertheless, what is known about the emergence of the PCC is also quite 
unsatisfactory, although, everything indicates that this organization was constituted, in 
1993, in the annex of the Casa de Custódia e tratamento de Taubaté (SP), known for 
its long history of ill treatment of inmates. Everything indicates that the organization 
grew from resistance to the bad treatment, as a form of protection against the arbitrary 
acts of the penitentiary agents and even against the tough disciplinary regime imposed 
by the direction of the penitentiary establishment.  
4  Only for mortality for external causes, a category that includes homicides, is there 
national data. Nevertheless, it comes from the Ministry of Health and not from the 
public safety or Justice departments of the federal government.
5  Cf. www1.folha.uol.com.br, Cotidiano, 19.1.2001. The complete text was reproduced 
by the press, it is not possible to determine, however, the authenticity of this 
document and its authorship.
6  The annex of the Casa de Custódia e tratamento de Taubaté was inaugurated in 
1985, it then became the Centro de Readaptação Penitenciária (decreto n.23.571, de 
17.6.1985). Aimed at violent imprisoned leaders of the rebellions, it keeps the inmates 
in rigid conditions of incarceration. This tough system of isolation and immobilization 
of the inmate was formalized in Resolution saP n.026 of May 2001, which instituted 
the Differentiated Disciplinary Regime. Federal law n.10.792, of Dec. 1, 2003, made 
it legal. 
7  For the control of abuse committed by penitentiary agents, there are, in Brazil, 
auditors in only nine states. In the same way, in 2003, half of Brazilian states do not 
have a monitoring system for the penitentiary system.  (Lemgruber, 2004). The lack 
of these organs or the constitution of ad hoc groups to conduct investigations, which 
rarely have properly prepared personnel,  indicates that the levels of  investigation of 
irregularities are low and thus, of punishment for the illegal practices in the prison 
units.
8  In the Massacre of Carandiru, the Military Police invaded the Casa de Detenção de 
São Paulo and  executed 103 inmates. The other prisoners died in conflicts among 
the prisoners themselves. In São Paulo’s 42nd Police District 18 prisoners died from 
suffocation, among the 51 who were confined by police on duty to an unventilated  
cell of 1.5m x 4 m. The police crowded them in the cell in reprisal for an escape 
attempt.
9  The law was approved in a rush and was the expression of strong pressure from 
society in light of the sense of insecurity that grew in the late 1980’s. The trigger for 
the approval of a law was the increase in the crime of extortion through kidnapping, 
particularly that of two businessmen, one in Rio de Janeiro and another in São Paulo.
10 Only with the manifestation of the federal Supreme Court, in 2006, in Habeas Corpus 
n.82.959-7, was there a reversal in the disposition of the law for complete serving of a 
sentence in prison. 
11 Federal Law n.11.466, of March 28, 2007, published in the Diário Oficial da União,
March 29, 2007, edição extra.
12 Cf. www.mj.gov.br/depen. Lei Federal n.11.464, de 28.3.2007. O Estado de S. Paulo,
“Lula sanciona lei mais dura para crime hediondo”, 31.3.2007.
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13 See the tables with data gathered by Julita Lemgruber for 2003. In Ceará, for example, 
there were thirteen prisoners per employee, and in Espírito Santo, fourteen. See www.
segurancahumana.org.br/home.htm
14 According to the Censo Penitenciário de 1994, conducted by the Ministry of Justice, 
55% of the inmates did not have any work activity. In 2003, the percentage of inmates 
working fell to 26.1%  (Lemgruber, 2004).
Bibliographic references
ADORNO, S. Sistema Penitenciário no Brasil: problemas e desafios. Revista USP, n.9, 
p.65-78, março-abril-maio 1991.
_______. Insegurança versus direitos humanos: entre a lei e a ordem. Tempo Social,
v.11, n.2, p.129-53, 2000.
_______. Le monopole étatique de la violence: le Brésil face à l’héritage occidental. 
Culture & Conflicts, n.59, p.149-74, 2005.
_______. Crimen, punición y prisiones en Brasil: um retrato sin retoques. Quorum. 
Revista Iberoamericana - Universidad de Alcalá, p.41-9, invierno 2006.
AMORIM, C. Comando Vermelho: a história secreta do crime organizado. Rio de 
Janeiro: Record, 1993. 
_______. CV-PCC: a irmandade do crime. Rio de Janeiro: Record, 2003. 
AZEVEDO, J. E. As relações de poder no sistema prisional. Revista Transdisciplinar 
de Ciências Penitenciárias, v.3, n.1, p.109-20, 2004. 
BARBATO JUNIOR, R. Direito informal e criminalidade: os códigos do cárcere e do 
tráfico. Campinas: Milennium, 2007. 
BAUMAN, Z. O mal-estar da pós-modernidade. Rio de Janeiro: Jorge Zahar, 1998.
BICUDO, H. Meu depoimento sobre o esquadrão da morte. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 
2002.
CALDEIRA, C. Bangu 3: desordem e ordem no quartel-general do Comando 
Vermelho. Insight Inteligência, n.22, p.91-115, 2003. 
_______. Bangu 1: a política do cárcere duro. Revista de Estudos Criminais, n.13, 
p.34-56, 2004. 
CAMPOS COELHO, E. Da Falange Vermelha a Escadinha: o poder nas prisões. In: 
A Oficina do Diabo e outros estudos sobre criminalidade. Rio de Janeiro: Record, 2005.
p.337-50.
CARDIA, N. et al. Homicídios de crianças e jovens no Brasil, 1980-2002. São Paulo: 
NEV-USP e Secretaria Especial de Direitos Humanos, Governo Federal, 2006. 
Disponível em: <www.nevusp.org>.
CARLINI, E. et al. Visão histórica sobre o uso de drogas: passado e presente. Rio de 
Janeiro e São Paulo. Jornal Brasileiro de Psiquiatria, v.45, n.4, abril 1996. 
CHRISTINO, M. Por dentro do crime - corrupção, tráfico, PCC. São Paulo: Fiúza, 
2001.
CONDEPE - Conselho Estadual de Defesa dos Direitos da Pessoa Humana. Crimes
de maio. São Paulo: Condepe, 2007. 
ESTUDOS AVANÇADOS 21 (61), 2007 27
DAVIS, M. Planeta favela. São Paulo: Boitempo, 2006. 
DURKHEIM, E. O suicídio. Estudo de sociologia.São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 2000. 
ENZENSBERGER, H. M. Politique et crime. Paris: Gallimard, 1967. 
FISHER, R.; ADORNO, S. Análise do Sistema Penitenciário do Estado de São Paulo: o 
gerenciamento da marginalidade social. São Paulo: Relatório de Pesquisa Cedec, 1987. 
FONTANAUD, D. (Org.) La Criminalité Organisée. Problèmes Politiques et Sociaux 
- Dossiers d’Actualité Mondiale, n.874-875. La Documentation Française, 2002. 
FOUCAULT, M. Il faut défendre la société. Paris: Gallimard, 1997. 
GURR, T. R. (Ed.) Violence in America. The history of crime.Newbury Park: Sage
Publications, 1989. v.1. 
JOZINO, J. Cobras e lagartos - a vida íntima e perversa nas prisões brasileiras. Quem 
manda e quem obedece no partido do crime. Rio de Janeiro: Objetiva, 2005.
LECLERC, M. (Org.) La criminalité organisée. Paris: IHESI, La Documentation
Française, 1996. 
LEMGRUBER, J. (Coord.) Arquitetura institucional do SUSP/Sistema Penitenciário.
Firjan/Pnud, 2004. Disponível em: <www.segurancahumana.org.br/home.htm>.
LIMA, R. C. A sociedade prisional e suas facções criminosas. Londrina: Edições
Humanidades, 2003. 
LIMA, W. da S. Quatrocentos contra um: uma história do Comando Vermelho. 
Petrópolis: Vozes, Iser, 1991. 
LUPO, S. História da máfia. Das origens aos nossos dias. São Paulo: Editora Unesp,
2002.
MESQUITA NETO, P. de. Mortes a esclarecer, crises a evitar. São Paulo: NEV-USP, 
2007. (Mimeogr.). 
MINGARDI, G. O Estado e o Crime Organizado. São Paulo: Ibccrim, 1998.
MISSE, M. Crime e violência no Brasil contemporâneo. Estudos de Sociologia do crime 
e da violência urbana. Rio de Janeiro: Lúmen Juris, 2006. 
MONSMA, K. et al. Solidariedade étnica, poder local e banditismo: uma quadrilha 
calabresa no Oeste Paulista, 1895-1898. Revista Brasileira de Ciências Sociais, v.18,
n.53, p.71-96, 2003. 
NAIM, M. Ilícito: o ataque da pirataria, da lavagem de dinheiro e do tráfico à 
economia global. Rio de Janeiro: Jorge Zahar, 2006. 
OLIVEIRA, A.; ZAVERUCHA, J. Tráfico de drogas: uma revisão bibliográfica. BIB
- Revista Brasileira de Informação Bibliográfica em Ciências Sociais, n.62, 2º Semestre, 
p.5-17, 2006. 
ORGANIZACIÓN PANAMERICANA DE LA SALUD. Situación de la salud en las 
Américas. Indicadores básicos. Washington: Paho, 2005. Disponível (vários anos) em: 
<www.paho.org/spanish>.
PAIXÃO, A. L. Recuperar ou punir? Como o Estado trata o criminoso. São Paulo, 
Cortez, 1987.
RAM, C. The United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime 
and its Protocols. Forum on Crime and Society, v.1, n.2, p.135-45, 2001. 
ESTUDOS AVANÇADOS 21 (61), 200728
RAYAN, P. J.; RUSH, G. E. (Org.) Understanding organized crime in global perspective. A 
reader. London: Sage Publications, 1997.
SALLA, F.; ALVAREZ, M. C. Apontamentos para uma história das práticas da tortura no 
Brasil. Revista Brasileira de Ciências Criminais, n.63, p.277-308, 2006. 
SALLA, F. As rebeliões nas prisões: novos significados a partir da experiência brasileira. 
Sociologias, n.16, p.274-304, 2006. 
_______. De Montoro a Lembo: as políticas penitenciárias de São Paulo. Revista Brasileira 
de Segurança Pública, v.1, n.1, p.72-90, 2007. 
SCHILLING, F. Corrupção, crime organizado e democracia. Revista Brasileira de 
Ciências Criminais, n.36, p.401-9, 2001. 
SOUZA, P. de. O Sindicato do Crime: PCC e outros grupos. São Paulo: Ediouro, 2006. 
SYKES, G. The Society of Captives. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974. 
TEIXEIRA, A. Do sujeito de direito ao estado de exceção: o percurso contemporâneo do 
sistema penitenciário brasileiro. São Paulo, 2006. Dissertação (Mestrado em Sociologia)
- Faculdade de Filosofia, Letras e Ciências Humanas, Universidade de São Paulo. 
TELLES, V. da S.; CABANES, R. (Org.) Nas tramas da cidade. Trajetórias urbanas e seus 
territórios. São Paulo: Humanitas, 2006. (Estudos Urbanos).
WEBER, M. Ciência e política. Duas vocações.São Paulo: Cultrix, 1970.
ZALUAR, A. Condomínio do diabo. Rio de Janeiro: UFRJ, Editora Revan, 1994. 
_______. Integração perversa: pobreza e tráfico de drogas. Rio de Janeiro: FGV, 2004. 
ZIEGLER, J. Os senhores do crime. São Paulo: Record, 2003.
ABSTRACT – The advent of organized crime in Brazilian prisons, especially in the 
state of São Paulo, constitutes the object of this article. The waves of attack unleashed 
by the Capital’s First Command (PCC – Primeiro Comando da Capital), in May 
2006, which resulted in countless deaths, brought cities to a halt, and cornered 
authorities in charge of preventing these events, keeping them from applying law 
and order, are the starting as well as reference points taken. The advent of organized 
criminality is analyzed under the light of determined axes: the international scenario 
and the Brazilian context, the historical antecedents, the taking root of crime in 
society and the role of penitentiary public policies.
KEYWORDS – Organized Crime, Prisons, Penitentiary Public Policies, Brazil, São
Paulo.
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